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Abstract 
In the present report, we describe the main steps we have taken in order to create a sound database 
for the European Union Member States banking system. The final goal is to use this database as 
source for input variables of SYMBOL (SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses) model, 
developed by the Join Research Centre of Ispra in cooperation with the European Commission 
Direcotrate General for Internal Market and Services and experts from academia, for monitoring 
financial crises. 
SYMBOL simulates potential crises in the banking sector under various assumptions, and it allows 
assessing the cumulative effects of different regulatory measures (e.g. higher capital requirements, 
strengthened deposit insurance and introduction of resolution funds) and their most effective 
combinations. It uses items in bank's balance sheet to estimate the potential losses for a given 
banking system via a Monte Carlo analysis. The model is flexible and can be deployed either on a 
single country or on a set of financial institutions sharing common features. 
The report also shows an application of SYMBOL for assessing the impact on public finance of a 
crisis in the baning sector and compares the current regulatory framework with a future scenario 
where the new capital requirements set in Basel III and an effective framework for bank resolution are 
in place. 
 
 
Keywords: Data mining, missing data, imputation, distribution function 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the present report, we describe the main steps we have taken in order to create a sound database 
for the European Union Member States (EU27) banking system. The final goal is to use this database 
as source for input variables of SYMBOL (SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses) model, 
developed by the Join Research Centre (JRC) of Ispra in cooperation with the European Commission 
Direcotrate General for Internal Market and Services and experts from academia, for monitoring 
financial crises.1 
SYMBOL simulates potential crises in the banking sector under various assumptions, and it allows 
assessing the cumulative effects of different regulatory measures (e.g. higher capital requirements, 
strengthened deposit insurance and introduction of resolution funds) and their most effective 
combinations. It uses items in bank's balance sheet to estimate the potential losses for a given 
banking system via a Monte Carlo analysis. The model is flexible and can be deployed either on a 
single country or on a set of financial institutions sharing common features. 
SYMBOL is a micro funded model working at single bank’s level. For each bank, we first compute 
using several items in bank’s balance sheet the Asset Probability to Defaults (AssetPD). Then 
according to bank’s characteristics, SYMBOL simulates a number of random scenarios, large enough 
to guarantee stability of losses distributions. Finally losses are compared with capital hold by the 
bank. 
Input variables needed for running SYMBOL are:  
- Asset PD: estimated from balance sheet variables; 
- Total Assets: taken from the balance sheet; 
- Capital Requirements: taken either from the balance sheet or reconstructed; 
- Customer Deposits: elaborated using data from balance sheet; 
- Inter-bank exposure: elaborated using data from balance sheet. 
The model may run also taking into consideration contagion between banks. Such effect is driven by 
inter-bank exposure. 
The main source of information for our database is Bankscope, which is a commercial data base 
developed by Bureau van Dijk2. Hereafter we refer to data relative to 2010. 
We start by describing some quantitative aspects of the dataset. For all EU Member States (MS), we 
select as many as 29 variables such as Total Assets, Regulatory Tier 1 Capital, Total Regulatory 
Capital, Common Equity , Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio, Risk Weighted Assets, Total Customer 
Deposits, Loans and Advances to Banks, Deposits from Banks, Total Deposits3. 
Institutions are listed in Bankscope under various categories according to their main activities (see 
Table 1). In particular, the following table reports all categories present in Bankscope and the number 
of European Union (EU) institutions reported in each of them 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Details on SYMBOL can be found in De Lisa R.; Zedda S.; Vallascas F.; Campolongo F. & Marchesi M., Modelling 
Deposit Insurance Scheme Losses in a Basel 2 Framework, Journal of Financial Services Research, 2011, 40, 123-141, 
and in Public Finance in Emu 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-
2011-3_en.pdf 
2  See http://www.bvdinfo.com/ 
3  Though SYMBOL needs only six variables, but in order to reconstruct missing (or possibly incorrect)  values one should 
use a larger set of variables. 
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Table 1: Specialization of banks in the sample. 
Specialization  
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 273 
Central Bank 27 
Clearing Institutions & Custody 40 
Commercial Banks 2,501 
Cooperative Bank 2,803 
Finance Companies (Credit Card, Factoring & Leasing) 492 
Group Finance Companies 39 
Investment & Trust Corporations 155 
Investment Banks 304 
Islamic Banks 8 
Micro-Financing Institutions 5 
Multi-Lateral Government Banks 2 
Other Non Banking Credit Institution 94 
Private Banking & Asset Mgt Companies 233 
Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 368 
Savings Bank 1203 
Securities Firm 186 
Specialized Governmental Credit Institution 162 
Total 8,895 
 
Furthermore, institutions are also divided according to the accounting system they use, being either 
consolidated (C-type) or unconsolidated (U-type), as detailed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Consolidation type. 
U-type banks C-type banks Total4 
7,310 1,570 8,880 
 
The main goal we would like to pursue, by using such dataset, is simulating potential losses which 
may hit public finances in single EU27 MS. In general, we will be interested only in U-type banks 
(whose activities mostly refer to the domestic market). Moreover we usually focus on commercial 
banks, cooperative banks and saving banks.  
For some specific countries, because of the peculiar nature of their banking system, we may include 
either a selection of C-type banks and/or banks whose activities are different from those we have 
mentioned. In Appendix A: effects of including C-type BANKS, we will discuss the effects of including 
these extra institutions. 
                                                 
4  One should notice that the total number of banks in this table differs from the total number of banks reported in Table 1. 
This is due to the presence of financial institution listed as A-type which we are not going to consider.  
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2. COHERENCE CHECKS AND IMPUTATION OF MISSING VALUES 
As for all databases some errors due either to missing information or to recording mistakes may be 
present. We have set a series of automatic checks to assure the internal coherence among variables. 
In particular we have checked: 
1. Banks for which Tier1 capital is larger than total assets: one U-type bank among those of the 
three main categories, in total three banks; 
2. Banks for which Total regulatory capital is larger than total assets (same subset of point 1.); 
3. Banks for which Common equity is larger than total assets. In this case we have a larger 
group. In particular we found 14 financial institutions 3 of them being Commercial bank. 
Due to the exiguous number of these anomalous records they have not been included in the final 
dataset.  
A more severe problem is related to missing values (see Table 3). We first observe that for some 
variables, typically banks’ Total Asset the only source of information is the balance sheet. Therefore 
we reduce our dataset according to data availability for this variable. Moreover in order to reconstruct 
missing values for Tier1 and Capital requirements, we need to have data for Common equity variable.  
 
Table 3: Data availability for total assets and equity, all banks (U-,C-,A-types). 
Total number of banks 8,895 
Number of banks with total asset 4,821 
Number of banks with common equity 4,786 
Number of banks with both total asset and common equity5 4,786 
 
Hence from now on we refer to a database containing 4,786 banks (U-type 3,905). 
Coming to the single country analysis, Table 4 reports the number of financial institutions (all 
specialization types) which are present in Bankscope (both total number and only those with common 
equity). It is worth noticing that for running SYMBOL we need capital requirements, and this variable 
is often missing in the balance sheets. We employ some robust regression techniques to reconstruct 
missing values. In Appendix E we describe in some details the statistical aspects of the procedure. 
 
Table 4: Number of institutions in each country (all types). 
Country Country code # of institutions # of institutions with common equity and TA data 
Belgium BE 216 81 
Bulgaria BG 43 30 
Czech Republic CZ 73 38 
Denmark DK 220 153 
Germany DE 2,892 1,718 
Estonia EE 30 11 
Ireland IE 132 52 
Greece GR 67 36 
Spain ES 418 198 
France FR 992 458 
Italy IT 1,162 624 
Cyprus CY 50 18 
Latvia LV 52 38 
                                                 
5  Banks with common equity is a proper subset of banks with total asset. 
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Country Country code # of institutions # of institutions with common equity and TA data 
Lithuania LT 26 18 
Luxembourg LU 218 85 
Hungary HU 81 32 
Malta MT 31 23 
Netherland NL 223 78 
Austria AT 432 257 
Poland PL 112 50 
Portugal PT 115 52 
Romania RO 60 29 
Slovenia SI 52 31 
Slovakia SK 46 23 
Finland FI 59 35 
Sweden SE 195 117 
United Kingdom UK 898 501 
Total  8,895 4,786 
 
2.1 MISSING VALUES IMPUTATION AND OUTLIERS DETECTIONS 
To give an idea of the number of missing values we need to reconstruct, we only consider U-type 
Commercial, Cooperative and Savings banks. The other cases (different specializations, C-type 
banks) show similar figures. The following table reports, for each country, the number of banks with or 
without values for capital requirements (either Tier1 or Regulatory Capital). 
 
Table 5: Number of institutions with data for capital. 
Country 
Regulatory Capital Tier1 
Yes No Yes No 
BE 0 31 0 31 
BG 13 4 13 4 
CZ 12 4 13 3 
DK 84 12 84 12 
DE 490 1007 256 1241 
EE 2 2 2 2 
IE 3 5 2 6 
GR 10 7 9 8 
ES 6 124 7 123 
FR 5 164 5 164 
IT 468 15 468 15 
CY 4 1 4 1 
LV 16 4 16 4 
LT 9 1 9 1 
LU 14 41 13 42 
HU 3 8 1 10 
MT 4 3 3 4 
NL 3 21 4 20 
AT 22 161 29 154 
PL 5 24 4 25 
PT 10 12 10 12 
RO 10 5 10 5 
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Country 
Regulatory Capital Tier1 
Yes No Yes No 
SI 9 6 11 4 
SK 4 4 4 4 
FI 7 2 7 2 
SE 71 1 71 1 
UK 40 67 39 68 
Total 1,324 1,736 1,094 1,966 
 
From Table 5, one can see that the number of records reporting values for capital requirement differs 
from country to country. On the other hand, whenever these variables are available, data show a 
strong correlation between capital requirement and common equity. Hence we use this fact to infer 
values for capital using common equity as explanatory variable.  
In order to have reliable results, we employ a set of algorithms developed at JRC enforcing robust 
regression techniques (see also Annex E). Among other advantages, this approach allows us to find 
anomalous values which were not already detected by previous analyses. To reconstruct capital 
requirements values, we may use three different levels: 
1) the whole database; 
2) country level; 
3) specialization types level. 
Since for some country we have small number of records where both capital requirements and 
common equity are available (for Belgium we have none) and since using the whole database may 
lead to some inconsistencies, we have chosen to approach the problem at bank’s specialization level. 
To give a glimpse of which kind of data we are using, we present in Figure 1 some plots, where 
correlation among data (actually strong collinearity) and outliers detection are evident. 
 
Figure 1: Outliers for U-type banks (all countries). 
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If we look at country level, outliers are mostly concentrated in few countries (see Table 6). In 
particular for Latvia and Poland the situation is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Table 6: Outliers in the sample at country level. 
Country AT GR HU IE LV MT NL PL RO SI 
U-type 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 
C-Type 0 1 0 2 5 2 0 3 4 1 
 
Figure 2: Outliers for U-type banks in Latvia dna Poland. 
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We repeat this exercise for all specialization categories and we use only those values not detected as 
outliers to regress capital requirements (both Tier1 and Regulatory Capital) versus Common equity. 
We now have a database where all records contain complete information about capital requirements 
(as well as total assets and common equity). 
As we have already mentioned, for some small countries we add to our dataset C-type banks and 
also banks whose specialization is different from Commercial, Cooperative and Savings. In particular 
we add: Bank Holding & Holding Companies, Finance Companies (Credit Card, Factoring & Leasing), 
Investment Banks, Real Estate & Mortgage Bank and Specialized Governmental Credit Institution 
(see Table 6 below for countries for which we have enlarged the dataset). Since U-type and C-type 
banks follow different accounting rules, throughout the entire process of outlier detection and the 
associate use of robust regression for imputation of missing values, we have kept clear the distinction 
between these two families.  
We should remark that the results of automatized search for outliers are followed by a direct analysis 
of the bank and the country involved. Then we may decide whether or not to keep the possible 
outliers on the basis of bank and country specific situation or if other sources of information were 
available to correct the data. For example we have not ruled out one bank in Netherland although it 
was detected as outlier by the automatized procedure. 
Moving from this, we proceed with the imputation of other two variables which are likely to be absent: 
1) Capital ratios: we have imputed missing values by using the country averages as reported by 
European Central Bank (ECB). Hence the database is now complete as capital variables are 
concerned. 
2) Risk Weighted Asset (RWA). RWA is imputed as the ratio between capital and capital ratio, and the 
capital requirement variable is then calculated as the 8% of RWA (Basel II framework).  
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In order to include in our analysis the impact of the new requirements set by Basel II, we have 
modified the values of capital requirements and RWA according to European Banking Authority (EBA) 
Quantitative Impact Study results6. Finally we restrict our data set to those banks for which Customer 
Deposit variable exists. 
 
3. SYMBOL DATABASE 
Once we have put in place all checks and imputation procedures as discussed in previous sections, 
we have a complete 2010 database for all 27 European Union MS. Table 7 shows the number of 
banks we have extracted from each country (last column refers to banks whose specialization 
according to Bankscope is different from commercial, cooperative or savings). 
 
Table 6: SYMBOL database. 
Country Banks G1Banks C-type Other specialization 
BE 28 3 0 0 
BG 21 0 1 2 
CZ 21 0 4 2 
DK 91 3 0 0 
DE 1469 7 0 0 
EE 5 0 1 0 
IE 20 9 2 8 
GR 20 6 1 2 
ES 126 6 0 0 
FR 160 10 0 0 
IT 480 7 0 0 
CY 11 0 4 3 
LV 21 0 3 0 
LT 9 0 0 0 
LU 52 1 0 0 
HU 18 2 5 4 
MT 12 0 0 5 
NL 20 3 0 0 
AT 171 0 0 0 
PL 35 0 6 1 
PT 28 7 6 4 
RO 22 0 7 1 
SI 16 0 0 1 
SK 13 0 3 4 
FI 12 4 1 3 
SE 63 3 0 0 
UK 86 10 0 0 
 
Because including C-type banks may give rise to several questions we refer to Appendix A, where we 
will discuss the differences between SYMBOL results obtained by including or not C-type banks. 
Apart from this issue, there are several aspects one should keep in mind, while analyzing (and using) 
SYMBOL results. 
                                                 
6  See http://www.eba.europa.eu/Publications/Quantitative-Impact-Study.aspx 
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3.1 SAMPLE DIMENSION 
From our extraction, and after all steps we have taken in order to have a reliable dataset, we have 
only a sample of banks, not the entire country population. Since our task is to estimate the impact of 
financial crisis on public finance, we need to rescale potential losses coming from SYMBOL 
simulations to the country banking system population. In order to have a reliable estimate of each 
country financial system population, we refer to data from the ECB, and we compare the sum of total 
assets in our sample to the ECB aggregate values. We should observe that ECB reports aggregate 
statistics of consolidated data, while we mainly consider unconsolidated data. Hence, to have a more 
credible ground for comparison we need to depurate ECB figures from foreign branches. Once we 
have these data we may compute the ratio sample/population for each country, see Table 8. 
 
Table 7: Ratio sample/population 
 Total Assets (m€)  
Country ECB no Branches Bankscope Ratio 
BE          1,041,052              803,991 77% 
BG                38,485                32,377 84% 
CZ              156,387              142,031 91% 
DK          1,096,635              565,751 52% 
DE          8,100,761          5,300,778 65% 
EE                14,856                24,433 164% 
IE          1,406,903          1,034,940 74% 
GR              478,123              427,774 89% 
ES          3,261,638          2,591,630 79% 
FR          7,693,831          6,223,479 81% 
IT          3,543,323          2,287,518 65% 
CY              127,185              113,805 89% 
LV                26,654                21,887 82% 
LT                21,063                19,078 91% 
LU              939,871              486,863 52% 
HU              117,328                91,620 78% 
MT                50,200                19,735 39% 
NL          2,184,189          1,717,377 79% 
AT              967,692              288,440 30% 
PL              297,124              172,478 58% 
PT              519,758              537,574 103% 
RO                85,574                53,015 62% 
SI                52,478                45,012 86% 
SK                54,361                29,769 55% 
FI              457,185              393,546 86% 
SE              984,365              513,176 52% 
UK          5,921,563          5,964,820 101% 
Total        39,638,584        29,902,897           75%  
 
We see that for some countries (e.g. Austria) the ratio population sample is quite low. Even though  
SYMBOL simulation results will be normalized using these ratios, a low value of sample dimension 
may indicate that some large banks are not considered, which may lead to underestimating the 
resulting losses. If necessary, different source of information may be used to enlarge the data set. 
We may also notice that for some countries the ratio is larger than 100%. This is due to the presence 
of C-type banks. It is still questionable if C-type banks should be included or not (see Appendix A). 
 12 
3.2 INTER-BANK EXPOSURE 
A second set of problems is related to different definitions banks use for the same variables. A typical 
case is the inter-bank exposure, which may or may not include debt certificates. We may consider 
running SYMBOL under two different hypotheses:  
1) Leave the Inter-bank market as Bankscope’s data (see Appendix B); 
2) Rescaled the inter-bank market according to ECB data (see Section 
 13 
4.1. SCENARIO 1). 
The ratios used to rescale the Inter-bank exposure have been computed by the following rule: 
   Equation 1 
 
where DebtCert is the amount of Debt certificates including bonds (all values have been rescaled 
according to total assets of domestic market, i.e. foreign branches have been excluded). In particular, 
for year 2010 inter-bank exposures are rescaled according to Table 9. 
 
Table 8: Inter-bank ratios. 
Country Inter-bank market ratios 
BE 0.56% 
BG 0.80% 
CZ 0.44% 
DK 0.23% 
DE 0.53% 
EE 0.97% 
IE 0.72% 
GR 0.77% 
ES 0.47% 
FR 0.54% 
IT 0.43% 
CY 0.99% 
LV 0.62% 
LT 0.35% 
LU 0.72% 
HU 0.61% 
MT 0.99% 
NL 0.19% 
AT 0.52% 
PL 0.59% 
PT 0.52% 
RO 0.80% 
SI 0.77% 
SK 0.56% 
FI 0.22% 
SE 1.00% 
UK 0.30% 
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3.3 COVERED DEPOSITS 
Covered deposits7 are used when SYMBOL results are post processed to study the impact of some 
tools which can be introduced in order to protect the public finance. In particular they are used to 
compute the size of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) funds needed to minimize the cost of 
systemic banking crises (see Section 4). To estimate covered deposits, we use the Bankscope 
variable “Customer Deposits”, which does not account for the amount of eligible and protected 
deposits8. 
JRC run a survey throughout the European network of natioanal DGSs asking, among other 
information, the percentages of eligible and covered deposits. For those countries with missing 
information we use the Eurostat database, where similar information can be extracted. In particular 
we have used Eurostat data to reconstruct the ratio for eligible deposit while for the covered deposit 
we have used estimates based on previous survey run by JRC9. The ratios used are reported in Table 
10.  
Table 9: Covered deposit ratios. 
Country Covered deposit ratios Source 
BE 66% Eurostat+JRC 
BG 63% Survey 
CZ 61% Eurostat+JRC 
DK 52% Eurostat+JRC 
DE 54% Eurostat+JRC 
EE 50% Survey 
IE 59% Eurostat+JRC 
GR 33% Survey 
ES 65% Eurostat+JRC 
FR 67% Survey 
IT 62% Eurostat+JRC 
CY 33% Survey 
LV 39% Eurostat+JRC 
LT 69% Eurostat+JRC 
LU 66% Eurostat+JRC 
HU 51% Survey 
MT 76% Eurostat+JRC 
NL 71% Eurostat+JRC 
AT 53% Survey 
PL 32% Survey 
PT 37% Survey 
RO 37% Survey 
SI 73% Survey 
SK 51% Survey 
FI 62% Survey 
SE 54% Eurostat+JRC 
UK 59% Eurostat+JRC 
 
                                                 
7  Covered deposits are those deposits which in case of bank default are protected from the deposit guarantee scheme. 
8  Eligible deposits are deposits repayable by the guarantee scheme under your national law, before the level of coverage 
is applied while Covered deposits are those obtained from eligible deposits when applying the level of coverage 
provided for in your national legislation. 
9  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm 
 15 
4. SYMBOL SIMULATIONS 
Once the database has been created and all ancillary parameters have been computed, SYMBOL 
simulations are run. Regarding SYMBOL we need to explain the settings we use. 
As already mention SYMBOL is used to simulate, via Monte Carlo experiments, potential losses in the 
banking system. Each run pretends to simulate one year. In the present setting we have fixed to 
100,000 the number of runs with at least one bank’s default. Because of the different sizes of 
countries’ banking systems the actual runs needed to reach 100,000 defaults varies from country to 
country. The final result will be the country’s aggregated excess losses (losses minus capital) for each 
simulated year. We then may decide to consider either the distribution conditioned to bank’s defaults 
(whose length is 100,000) or the unconditional distribution whose length varies depending on country. 
Currently, we have run two different sets of simulations, representing two different regulatory 
scenarios to manage a banking crisis10: 
1) Scenario 1: This scenario represent the current situation where banks have started to improve 
the quality of their capital in compliance with the new Basel III rules and satisfy a minimum 
capital requirement of 8% of the risk weighted assets (see Section 4.1). The resolution 
framework in place is assumed not to be capable to stop contagion effects. 
2) Scenario 2: The second scenario represents a future situation where Basel III is fully 
implemented, banks’ capital requirements are at least equal to 10.5% of RWA (i.e. the basel III 
capital conservation buffer is implemented). Contagion is stopped by an effective resolution 
framework which includes: (i) ex-ante funds for bank resolution at 1% of the amount og 
covered deposits, (ii) bail-in regime is implemented to guarantee a total loss absorbing 
Capacity  at 10% of total liabilities (see Section 4.2). This scenario represent the full 
implementation of Basel III and the introduction of an effective EU resolution framework. 
We should notice that for numerical stability reasons for some countries (e.g. the three Baltic States), 
we have also run simulations where they have been considered together as a unique country11. The 
results are very similar in the case contagion does not take place and they differ whenever contagion 
has been considered. Results of this particular analysis would be found in 
                                                 
10  One can find arguments for these choices in http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm 
11  This will imply the assumption that Inter-bank market across these countries show similar features as the genuine 
internal market. 
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Appendix B: the case of BALTIC STATES. 
In the following, we will present the results of SYMBOL simulations regarding the national aggregate 
at selected percentile for the unconditional distribution of excess losses (losses minus capital). 
Moreover we have also computed, this time on the conditional distributions, the percentiles where the 
excess losses are larger than 0.1% and 1% of country’s GDP. 
Finally we have also calculated at which percentile excess losses are larger that S2. 
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4.1. SCENARIO 1 
In this case we have capital requirement set at 8% of the RWA and contagion is considered. Because 
of the contagion effects, the role of the inter-bank market is essential. To quantify this aspect we have 
also run SYMBOL using the same data set but with no reduction for inter-bank. Results may be found 
in Appendix C. If inter-bank exposures are rescaled by using data as in Table 8, we obtain results in 
Table 11, where we report selected percentiles of the unconditional distribution of excess losses, i.e. 
losses not covered by banks’ capital and funds available in the safety net. 
 
Table 10: Distribution of losses in m€ for scenario 1 (no capital conservation buffer and no effective resolution 
framework.  
  95 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.999 
BE 0  0 35 9,505 15,535 33,825  55,546  
BG 0  0 0 42 93 289  767  
CZ 0  0 0 130 379 1,346  3,204  
DK 0  0 18 644 3,261 10,790  30,722  
DE 21  430 1,544 21,105 41,666 161,914  282,877  
EE 0  0 0 0 0 1,430  2,074  
IE 0  62,520 77,946 92,229 98,319 114,048  141,752  
GR 0  17 145 2,752 5,969 25,013  35,854  
ES 0  117 714 7,769 14,353 37,011  75,313  
FR 128  1,895 4,905 59,693 185,512 292,692  399,813  
IT 54  690 1,567 6,889 11,294 30,698  69,602  
CY 0  1 2 109 608 3,076  7,413  
LV 0  0 1 67 118 313  805  
LT 0  0 0 30 75 243  635  
LU 0  0 47 53,009 61,192 77,319  95,440  
HU 0  0 0 119 345 1,183  3,478  
MT 0  0 0 100 252 722  1,785  
NL 0  0 20 1,019 3,632 20,112  56,218  
AT 0  77 311 3,092 6,164 20,569  40,569  
PL 0  0 44 370 691 2,016  6,199  
PT 0  291 1,655 7,433 13,483 22,026  32,440  
RO 0  0 0 89 220 663  1,846  
SI 0  25 674 1,561 2,007 3,165  4,866  
SK 0  0 0 99 233 715  1,601  
FI 0  13 68 504 6,515 12,998  25,260  
SE 0  0 0 4,274 13,975 41,598  68,413  
UK 0  91 774 18,494 31,233 71,161  147,745  
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In order to compare, across European MS, the amount of potential losses hitting each country’s 
banking system we compute the percentiles for which losses are larger than two thresholds based on 
country’s economy: namely we have set these two thresholds to be equal to 0.1% and 1% of country 
GDP. Table 12 shows both these percentiles and the ratios losses/GDP at selected percentiles. 
 
Table 11: Distribution of losses over GDP for scenario 1 (no capital conservation buffer and no effective 
resolution framework 
  
Percentiles Thresholds 
95 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.999 0.1%GDP 1%GDP 
BE 0% 0% 0% 3% 4% 10% 16% 77% 80% 
BG 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 62% 98% 
CZ 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 76% 98% 
DK 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 5% 13% 85% 93% 
DE 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 6% 11% 98% 100% 
EE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 14% 35% 44% 
IE 0% 41% 51% 60% 64% 74% 92% 4% 25% 
GR 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 11% 16% 66% 91% 
ES 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 7% 79% 96% 
FR 0% 0% 0% 3% 9% 14% 19% 88% 97% 
IT 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 96% 100% 
CY 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 18% 42% 99% 99% 
LV 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 49% 95% 
LT 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 51% 96% 
LU 0% 0% 0% 127% 147% 186% 229% 24% 54% 
HU 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 39% 92% 
MT 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 12% 29% 23% 60% 
NL 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 10% 79% 94% 
AT 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 14% 81% 96% 
PL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 89% 100% 
PT 0% 0% 1% 4% 8% 13% 19% 60% 83% 
RO 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 66% 99% 
SI 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 5% 7% 49% 68% 
SK 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 30% 87% 
FI 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 7% 14% 82% 94% 
SE 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 12% 20% 78% 78% 
UK 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 9% 95% 99% 
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4.2. SCENARIO 2 
In this case we consider SYMBOL results based on the same dataset as in Scenario 1, with capital 
requirements as set by Basel III (10.5% of RWA) . We do not consider contagion effects. In the post 
processing phase, we introduce two instruments whose intervention is aimed to minimize the impact 
of systemic crises on public finances:  
(i) part of losses would be covered by both DGS/RF funds set at the value corresponding to 
1% of covered deposits; 
(ii) part of losses would be absorbed by bail-in instruments. The amount of bail-in bonds for 
each bank is such that the total Loss Absorbing Capacity (LAC) of the bank (capital + bail-
in instruments) equals 0% of the total liabilities.  
Since contagion is not considered there is not difference in rescaling or not the inter-banks values.  
For such scenario results are reported in Table 13 and 14. Regarding the levels of potential losses 
they are significantly lower than those in the previous scenario. 
 
Table 13: Distribution of losses in m€ for scenario 2 (Basel III fully implemented and effective resolution 
framework in place with ex-ante funds and bail-in instruments). 
  95 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.999 
BE 0  0 0 0 0 0  4,781  
BG 0  0 0 0 0 36  341  
CZ 0  0 0 0 0 52  1,640  
DK 0  0 0 0 0 0  3,061  
DE 0  0 0 0 0 0  1,279  
EE 0  0 0 0 0 70  682  
IE 0  0 0 0 0 1,541  8,440  
GR 0  0 0 0 0 922  5,627  
ES 0  0 0 0 0 3,253  30,622  
FR 0  0 0 0 0 0  27,504  
IT 0  0 0 0 0 0  10,453  
CY 0  0 0 0 0 344  2,624  
LV 0  0 0 0 0 92  324  
LT 0  0 0 0 0 67  361  
LU 0  0 0 0 0 0  6,088  
HU 0  0 0 0 0 278  1,373  
MT 0  0 0 0 0 104  640  
NL 0  0 0 0 0 4,176  40,126  
AT 0  0 0 0 0 0  4,422  
PL 0  0 0 0 0 607  2,333  
PT 0  0 0 0 0 1,544  6,067  
RO 0  0 0 0 0 209  977  
SI 0  0 0 0 0 257  1,072  
SK 0  0 0 0 0 213  1,012  
FI 0  0 0 0 0 174  1,735  
SE 0  0 0 0 0 56  10,587  
UK 0  0 0 0 0 0  27,824  
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Table 12: Losses over GDP for scenario 2 (Basel III fully implemented and effective resolution framework in 
place with ex-ante funds and bail-in instruments). 
  
Percentiles Thresholds 
95 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.999 0.1%GDP 1%GDP 
BE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 97% 99% 
BG 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 96% 100% 
CZ 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 97% 100% 
DK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 99% 100% 
DE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% Never 
EE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 58% 76% 
IE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 5% 94% 98% 
GR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 96% 99% 
ES 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 99% 100% 
FR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 100% 100% 
IT 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 100% 100% 
CY 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 15% 100% 100% 
LV 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 92% 99% 
LT 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 90% 99% 
LU 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 99% 99% 
HU 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 88% 99% 
MT 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 10% 87% 90% 
NL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 7% 98% 98% 
AT 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 100% 100% 
PL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 98% 100% 
PT 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 95% 99% 
RO 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 93% 100% 
SI 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 94% 99% 
SK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 88% 96% 
FI 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 99% 100% 
SE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 98% 99% 
UK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 100% 100% 
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APPENDIX A: EFFECTS OF INCLUDING C-TYPE BANKS 
Here, we discuss the differences one obtains by including or not C-type banks in the dataset. As 
already observed this occurrence happens only for some countries: the main reason being use larger 
data set in order to minimize possible numerical instability in SYMBOL simulations. In particular we 
included C-type banks for the following MS: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. 
We first show the differences when computing sample/population ratios we get by including or not C-
type banks, see Table 15. 
 
Table 13: Effect of including C-type banks in the sample for selected MS.  
 
Sample/population 
original database 
Sample/population 
no C-type banks 
Bulgaria 84% 79% 
Cyprus 89% 12% 
Czech Republic 91% 87% 
Estonia 164% 30% 
Finland 86% 84% 
Greece 89% 71% 
Hungary 78% 48% 
Ireland 74% 65% 
Latvia 82% 70% 
Netherland 79% 57% 
Poland 58% 34% 
Portugal 103% 78% 
Romania 62% 52% 
Slovakia 55% 36% 
 
There are countries for which the including C-type institutions would not change significantly the ratios 
sample/population (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland). For others the variations are still acceptable 
(Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Romania) while for the remaining the differences are quite dramatic.   
For all these countries, we have a run a SYMBOL simulation test in order to assess the impact of 
having included C-type banks. To properly compare results we have computed the relative 
differences between simulations with C-type banks ( ) and simulations without them ( ), and in 
particular we have used the following formula: 
 
   Equation 2 
 
We show in Table 16 the results in the case of Scenario 1 and only for selected percentiles. 
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Table 14: Effects of including C-type banks on the distribution of losses for selected contries (see Equation 2). 
 95 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.999 
Bulgaria    -2% -1% 1% 0% 
Cyprus 38% 37% 37% -9% -29% 31% 19% 
Czech Republic    0% 1% 2% 2% 
Estonia      -50% -6% 
Finland  0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Greece  -2% -1% 9% 19% 8% 6% 
Hungary    -50% -25% 8% 7% 
Ireland  -44% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% 
Latvia   -50% 6% 7% 6% 5% 
Poland   -50% -2% 1% 14% 10% 
Portugal  -19% 7% 8% 5% 4% 3% 
Romania    -44% -23% -1% 14% 
Slovakia    -29% -11% -10% -8% 
 
One can see that there are significant differences in many cases. It is also worth noticing that for the 
tail of the distribution, there are countries for which the difference is of the order of few points of 
percentage. Typically this happens for countries for which C-type banks would not change the ratios 
sample/population. What happens in all other cases should be better analyzed on the basis of 
country’s characteristics.  One possible approach may be to use ECB Total Assets without excluding 
foreign branches for those countries with C-type banks. 
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APPENDIX B: THE CASE OF BALTIC STATES 
Baltic States Estonia (5 banks), Lithuania (9 banks) and Latvia (21 banks) are quite peculiar. First 
they have a relative small financial sector (in particular Estonia) and they seem sharing some cross 
country financial institutions. For these reasons we have considered a different approach: we have 
put them all together and we have use SYMBOL to simulate the potential losses of their aggregated 
financial sector. Losses were then split based on banks’ contry of origin. As expected when contagion 
is off (Scenario 2) results considering them separately or as whole are very similar (see Table 17). 
When contagion works results show some losses variations: which need to be discussed. One can 
see that potential losses for the two smaller countries (Estonia and Lithuania) are generally smaller 
when they are considered as part of a larger financial sector while they are larger for (Latvia).  
Table 15: Baltic States comparison (Scenario 2). 
 
Estonia Lithuania Latvia 
Alone Together Alone Together Alone Together 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 
97 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.925 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.975 0 0 0 0 28,438 28,835 
99.99 70,127 71,617 66,917 67,790 91,831 92,299 
99.995 243,181 252,326 141,656 140,800 153,570 152,731 
99.999 682,231 659,694 360,746 355,544 324,050 332,471 
 
Table 16: Baltic States differences (Scenario 1) 
 Estonia Lithuania Latvia 
 Alone Together Relative differences12 Alone Together 
Relative 
differences Alone Together 
Relative 
differences 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,040 1,535 -10% 
99.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,404 21,084 -1% 
99.9 0 0 0 29,797 25,241 4% 66,654 68,339 -1% 
99.925 0 0 0 46,851 40,023 4% 85,886 89,999 -1% 
99.95 0 0 0 75,416 64,456 4% 118,438 131,240 -3% 
99.975 1,596 5,260 -27% 139,660 113,320 5% 187,352 240,919 -6% 
99.99 1,429,753 755,889 15% 242,690 192,358 6% 312,640 416,352 -7% 
99.995 1,628,389 956,683 13% 339,597 267,382 6% 433,832 619,896 -9% 
99.999 2,073,845 1,392,177 10% 634,672 495,586 6% 805,204 1,196,505 -10% 
                                                 
12  Relative differences are computed as in Equation 2.  
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APPENDIX C: NO REDUCTION FOR THE INTER-BANK EXPOSURE 
Here we present the same SYMBOL results we had in Scenario 1, with the only difference lying in 
having used the Inter-bank exposure as coming from Bankscope (i.e. it has not been rescaled 
according to ECB data). As expected larger values for the Inter-bank would give rise to stronger 
effects for the contagion.  
According to the expected stronger impact of the contagion these values are smaller than those 
presented in Section 4.1. Table 19 shows the relative differences between SYMBOL results obtained 
under the hypothesis that Interbank has been rescaled and SYMBOL results with no rescaling. 
 
Table 17: Inter-bank impact on distribution of losses for Scenairo 1. 
 95 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.999 Average 
Belgium  0% 0% 0% -35% -29% -17% -11% -19% 
Bulgaria  0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -2% -4% -2% 
Czech Republic  0% 0% 0% -1% -6% -4% -3% -4% 
Denmark  0% 0% 0% -4% -26% -36% -24% -18% 
Germany  0% -1% -2% -43% -39% -22% -17% -18% 
Estonia  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% -1% 
Ireland  0% -16% -12% -10% -9% -8% -7% -10% 
Greece  0% 0% -2% -15% -25% -10% -7% -10% 
Spain  0% -1% -3% -9% -11% -15% -16% -9% 
France  0% -2% -13% -40% -25% -18% -15% -16% 
Italy  0% -3% -7% -8% -11% -29% -25% -12% 
Cyprus  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Latvia  0% 0% -1% -8% -10% -11% -14% -9% 
Lithuania  0% 0% 0% -2% -7% -19% -23% -13% 
Luxembourg  0% 0% -1% -20% -18% -14% -12% -13% 
Hungary  0% 0% 0% -12% -23% -16% -15% -17% 
Malta  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Netherland 0% 0% -1% -5% -20% -22% -19% -13% 
Austria  0% -1% -20% -44% -40% -28% -19% -25% 
Poland  0% 0% -1% -4% -7% -17% -18% -9% 
Portugal  0% -9% -18% -33% -24% -17% -13% -19% 
Romania  0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -2% -5% -2% 
Slovenia  0% -3% -8% -8% -8% -7% -6% -7% 
Slovakia  0% 0% 0% -2% -1% -1% -1% -1% 
Finland  0% -1% 0% -4% -32% -23% -16% -13% 
Sweden  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
United Kingdom  0% -2% -6% -42% -40% -33% -25% -21% 
 
We use the average of loss differences  (last column), to see if any relation can be found between 
Iiter-bank impact and the size of reduction we have used. 
We consider the ratios we used for reducing the inter-bank (see Table 8: Inter-bank ratios) as 
explanatory variable for the last column in Table 17: Inter-bank impact. We try to see if there exists 
at least a subset of countries for which the inter-bank ratios may explain the reduction in potential 
losses. By using the same robust technique procedure we have used for imputation of capital’s 
variables (see Section 2.1 and Appendix E) we obtain results presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2: Intebank outliers 
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In particular the outliers are the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovakia. This would 
imply that in many cases the role of the Inter-bank does not only depend on its size, but other aspects 
would come into the picture. 
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APPENDIX D: THE SUSTAINABILITY INDICATOR S2 
The S2 indicator is part of the family of sustainability gap indicators. It shows (in % of GDP) the 
permanent adjustment necessary for the structural primary balance to achieve debt stabilization in the 
long term13.  
In the current analysis the impact on S2 of a banking crisis has been estimated by considering 
potential losses from banking crises as a stochastic additional component of current debt burden. This 
led to the construction of possible end-of-year debt levels including banking sector loss spillovers 
under each scenario. Based on these distributions and on the current level of S2, it is possible to 
calculate the probability that an unsustainable debt burden will be reached by the end of the year due 
to a banking crisis. This procedure makes use of two main assumptions: the first is that all losses 
generated in the banking sector and absorbed by public finances will be covered with new debt 
emissions (leading to overestimation); the second is that assumptions on the cost of debt will not vary 
with respect to the conditions assumed in the standard S2 analysis (leading to an underestimation). 
Results base on SYMBOL simulations are at the moment not very instructive, but for sake of 
completeness we report them in the Table 20. 
Table 18: Estimated S2 indicators. 
  S2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Scenario 1  
No IB Reduction 
Belgium  100% NaN NaN NaN 
Bulgaria  19% NaN NaN NaN 
Czech Republic  44% NaN NaN NaN 
Denmark  45% NaN NaN 100% 
Germany  80% NaN NaN NaN 
Estonia  6% 45% 98% 45% 
Ireland  121% 100% NaN 100% 
Greece  199% NaN NaN NaN 
Spain  78% NaN NaN NaN 
France  92% NaN NaN NaN 
Italy  119% NaN NaN NaN 
Cyprus  71% NaN NaN NaN 
Latvia  47% NaN NaN NaN 
Lithuania  39% NaN NaN NaN 
Luxembourg  20% 73% 100% 63% 
Hungary  77% NaN NaN NaN 
Malta  72% 100% NaN 100% 
Netherland 66% NaN NaN NaN 
Austria  74% NaN NaN NaN 
Poland  58% NaN NaN NaN 
Portugal  112% NaN NaN NaN 
Romania  36% NaN NaN NaN 
Slovenia  55% NaN NaN NaN 
Slovakia  51% NaN NaN NaN 
Finland  54% NaN NaN NaN 
Sweden  32% 100% NaN 100% 
United Kingdom  86% NaN NaN NaN 
                                                 
13 The indicator has two components: an "initial budgetary position" component (representing the adjustment necessary to 
stabilise debt under current structural deficit) and the required additional adjustment due to long-term changes in 
government expenditure (e.g. related to ageing 
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APPENDIX E: ROBUST REGRESSION FOR OUTLIERS DETECTION AND IMPUTATION OF 
MISSING VALUES  
The goal of robust statistics is to build estimators independent from model assumption deviations and 
identify outliers, i.e. observations which are distant from the bulk of the observed data and can hardly 
comply with model assumptions.  
The discipline has grown considerably in the last two decades and many robust methods are 
available in the literature (the book of Maronna, R. A.; Martin, D. R. & Yohai, V. J. Robust Statistics: 
Theory and Methods Wiley , 2006   is an excellent introduction to the field). 
Among such methods, the Forward Search of Atkinson and Riani (Robust Diagnostic Regression 
Analysis Springer--Verlag , 2000) has shown superior properties in terms of size and power For a 
regression problem with p explanatory variables, the Forward Search (FS) builds subsets of 
increasing size m, starting from m_o = p, until all observations are included. The subsets are built 
using simple ordering criteria: at step m, the traditional least squares is used for fitting the m 
observations in the current subset and the next subset is built with the m+1 units with smaller 
residuals of the fitted model.   
During the process, as m goes from p to n, we can monitor the evolution of model estimates, the 
residuals of the fitted model, or other test regression statistics. 
In absence of outliers we expect that during the search process all these statistics remain rather 
constant or show smooth increases.  
On the contrary the entry of outliers, which by construction will happen in the last subsets, will be 
revealed by appreciable changes of the monitored statistics. 
For an important statistic, the minimum deletion residual among observations not in the subset, 
distributional results and confidence bands can be used to identify precisely the outliers. 
The Forward Search offers a very natural way to keep into account the potential presence of perfect 
fit cases, by monitoring the value of the coefficient of determination (R2) during the search.  
A value of R2 that during the progression of the search stays constantly close to 1 is an indication of 
almost perfect fit. 
In such case, we disregard outlier signals based on the standard diagnostic regression statistics, such 
as the minimum deletion residual, and we increase the confidence level to declare observations as 
anomalous. 
This approach has been implemented using routines contained in the FSDA toolbox for Matlab, 
developed jointly by the University of Parma and the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission (Riani, M.; Perrotta, D. & Torti, F. FSDA: A MATLAB toolbox for robust analysis and 
interactive data exploration, Chemometrics and Intelligent Laboratory Systems, 2012) which is freely 
available for non-commercial use from http://www.riani.it/MATLAB or http://fsda.jrc.ec.europa.eu. 
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Abstract 
 
In the present report, we describe the main steps we have taken in order to create a sound database for the European 
Union Member States banking system. The final goal is to use this database as source for input variables of SYMBOL 
(SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses) model, developed by the Join Research Centre of Ispra in cooperation with 
the European Commission Direcotrate General for Internal Market and Services and experts from academia, for 
monitoring financial crises. SYMBOL simulates potential crises in the banking sector under various assumptions, and it 
allows assessing the cumulative effects of different regulatory measures (e.g. higher capital requirements, strengthened 
deposit insurance and introduction of resolution funds) and their most effective combinations. It uses items in bank's 
balance sheet to estimate the potential losses for a given banking system via a Monte Carlo analysis. The model is 
flexible and can be deployed either on a single country or on a set of financial institutions sharing common features. The 
report also shows an application of SYMBOL for assessing the impact on public finance of a crisis in the banking sector 
and compares the current regulatory framework with a future scenario where the new capital requirements set in Basel 
III and an effective framework for bank resolution are in place. 
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